July 20, 2007
What We Told Our Readers to Tell Their Children About Vietnam Posted by Frederic D. Schwarz at 02:30 PM EST The first major article I worked on after joining the American Heritage copy department in 1988 was called “What Should We Tell Our Children About Vietnam?” An Oklahoma schoolteacher who had served in Vietnam wrote to many public figures, asking for advice on what to tell his students, and we published their responses. Many of these were fascinating, but—typically for a publishing employee—what I remember most about this piece was what a monumental pain it was to fit the copy. As the article appeared in our pages, each individual response had its own heading, which was usually four lines deep and needed a couple of lines of text beneath it. Since these heads could not be split by a column break, just about every response had to have lines cut or added. I gave Richard Snow, then our managing editor, a monumentally complicated set of galleys filled with instructions like, “Cut 7 lines total from next 3 items OR add 2 lines to first item.” Richard, in what I would soon come to realize was typical fashion for him, described my efforts as “lapidary.” I had to look it up. Oh, and did I mention that this was the last issue we put together by sending out for type, instead of using our own computers? We would tell the typesetter, “First 6 lines 10.5 picas wide, right justified, followed by 24 lines 21 picas wide,” and if they messed it up or left out a word, we’d have to wait another day for them to do it all over again. Then we would make our cuts and have the typesetters reset the entire thing and fix all their new errors, after which we would make more adds and cuts and send it out again. This was my introduction to publishing. With all these busy memories, you will understand why my recollection of the article itself was rather sketchy. My main impression was of a bunch of blowhards spouting their usual boilerplate. But the other day I came across this article while looking for links to accompany Allen Barra’s review of Rescue Dawn, and as I skimmed through it, the words that in 1988 I had seen essentially as marbles to be fit into a box now sounded a lot more interesting, especially in view of events that have occurred since. The entire article is worth a look, but below are some widely varying viewpoints that struck me as especially telling, in both positive and negative ways. They have been chosen with a mild bias towards respondents who remain prominent today.
Richard Armitage
Naval Operations Coordinator, Defense Attaché Office, Saigon, Vietnam, 1973-75; now Assistant Secretary of Defense
First, the U.S. government was unwilling or, perhaps, unable to articulate effectively goals and objectives for our involvement in Vietnam, thus failing to mobilize public support for this sacrifice. Second, the government failed to realize that Dau Tranh (Vietnamese for “struggle”) had both military and political applications and that the Vietnamese Communists gave equal weight to both sides of this equation. Third, once committed to sacrifice, we did not fight to win because of political constraints. . . . . Patience is not a well-known attribute of democracy; thus a consistent and credible rationale for our actions must be presented to enable the government to continue its course. —————————— Malcolm Browne
Chief Indochina Correspondent, Associated Press, 1961-65; Saigon Correspondent, ABC, 1965-66 Maybe the lesson of Vietnam was this: If you really want to win a war, you’re best off fighting it on your own, with as little help from outside as possible. I watched South Vietnamese fighting spirit evaporate in direct proportion to increases in the level of U.S. aid, combat assistance, and advice that was poured in. It’s just possible that Saigon would have waged a better war if we had simply stayed out. . . . —————————— George Bush
Director, CIA, 1974–75; now Vice-President of the United States —We must ensure that any major foreign policy commitment has the full support and understanding of the American people, for it is through their sons and daughters and their tax dollars that our power and influence are projected. Without such support a protracted U.S. involvement cannot succeed. —The United States must have a clear understanding of the historical processes at work. The United States viewed the Vietnam War as the first step in China’s drive to expand its influence throughout Southeast Asia, forgetting the long history of fighting between China and Vietnam. In fact, Chinese-Vietnamese hostility reemerged soon after our withdrawal. —The United States entered the Vietnam War viewing it as another Korea. In fact, the causes for the war, the topography, and the methods used by the enemy were very different. —The United States essentially fought the war for the South Vietnamese. In future conflicts of this type, every effort must be made to encourage the beleaguered people of a country to fight for their own survival, as is being done in Afghanistan and Nicaragua. —————————— Arthur J. Goldberg
U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations, 1965–68 The most important lessons for students to learn from the disastrous Vietnam War: One, America should never be involved in a war where its vital national interests are not at stake. Two, our country should never engage in a war which is not declared by Congress in a formal declaration, as required by our Constitution. —————————— Barry Goldwater
U.S. Senator from Arizona, 1953–65,1969–87 The best thing I could tell your students is that when you decide to go to war, you must at the same instant decide to win it. It’s just like having a fight with another fellow: If you go into it halfheartedly, you’re going to get the daylights beat out of you. That’s about what happened in Vietnam. We had some brilliant victories over there, but we also had some dreadful decisions made in Washington, relative to our efforts. —————————— Timothy Leary
Producer of Psychedelic Celebrations, 1965–66; wrote and acted in the film Turn On, Tune In, Drop Out It was a disastrous, insane, imperial invasion of a weirdo Third World country. It will leave a deep scar in the American soul for one generation. Trust the CIA, not the military, for estimates about military events. —————————— John S. McCain III
Prisoner of War, Vietnam, 1967–73; now U.S. Senator from Arizona Following the end to U.S. involvement in Indochina, Gen. Maxwell Taylor stated the conditions under which he thought it was appropriate to commit U.S. troops overseas. I subscribe to General Taylor’s criteria and believe these maxims must be adhered to in the wake of our misfortunes in Vietnam. First, the objectives of the commitment must be explainable to the man in the street in one or two sentences. Second, there must be clear support of the President by Congress. Third, there must be reasonable expectation of success. Finally, there must be a clear American interest at stake. —————————— John D. Negroponte
Second Secretary for the Department of State in Saigon, 1964—68; U.S. Delegate to the Paris Peace Talks, 1968–69 I think the most important thing for your students to know about the Vietnam War is that the United States lost. For countries, just like individuals, I think that learning the true meaning of the maxim “You can’t win them all” is an inevitable part of the maturation process. . . . But most important of all, I think we picked a difficult fight in a very faraway place. I am sure the results will help ensure that we pick our fights more carefully in the future. —————————— George S. Patton
Military Assistance Command, Vietnam, 1962–63; Commanding Officer, llth Armored Cavalry Regiment, Vietnam, 1968–69 The most important point your students must understand, is that because of our defeat in so-called limited warfare by an eighth-rate power (if that high), our enemies have discovered an Achilles’ heel and are putting it to us in Central America today. We have demonstrated a weakness in this type of conflict, and they are capitalizing on that weakness. Because of that, some blood may be spilled in that area in the future, if we have to invade. Cuba is the problem—not Nicaragua. —————————— Nicholas Proffitt
Newsweek Bureau Chief, Saigon, 1972 There were no “good guys” or “bad guys” in Vietnam. There were good people and evil people on both sides. You know the story of the American Revolution. To most of the Vietcong, we Americans were the British. They were the Americans. —————————— Ronald Reagan
Governor of California, 1967–74; now President of the United States Vietnam was not so much a war as it was one long battle in an ongoing war—the war in defense of freedom, which is still under assault. This battle was lost not by those brave American and South Vietnamese troops who were waging it but by political misjudgments and strategic failure at the highest levels of government. The tragedy—indeed, the immorality—of those years was that for the first time in our history our country and its government failed to match the heroic sacrifice of our men in the field. This must never happen again. —————————— Elliot L. Richardson
Secretary of Defense, 1973; U.S. Attorney General, 1973 First, today’s junior high students should understand that the United States should never undertake a military action that cannot, whether for military or political reasons, be successfully carried out. Second, because there are many situations like Vietnam and Nicaragua where decisive U.S. military action is not appropriate or feasible, the United States needs to exert effective leadership in pursuing alternative means of protecting its security interests. —————————— Arthur Schlesinger, Jr.
Author and historian; Special Assistant to the President, 1961–64 It is a great mistake for the United States to get involved in any war beyond its zone of direct and vital interests. We are not world saviors—either in Vietnam in the 1960s or in the Persian Gulf in the 1980s. —————————— William C. Westmoreland
Commander, U.S. Military Assistance Command, Vietnam, 1964–68; Chief of Staff, U.S. Army, 1968–72 The Vietnam War was a limited war, with limited objectives, prosecuted by limited means, with limited public support. Therefore, it was destined to be (and was) a long war, a war so long that public support waned and political decisions by the Congress terminated our involvement, resulting in a victory by the North Vietnamese Communists. The military did not lose a battle of consequence and did not lose the war. The war was lost by congressional actions withdrawing support to the South Vietnamese government despite commitments by President Nixon.
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